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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

PEE DEE HEALTHCARE, P.A. V. SANFORD: RURAL
HEAL TH CARE PROVIDERS HAVE A RIGHT TO ENFORCE
MEDICAID REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMS BY SUING
STATE OFFICIALS PURSUANT TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983
By: Michael Gillman
In an issue of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit held that rural healthcare providers serving
Medicaid recipients had a right under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 ("§ 1983") to
sue state officials to enforce rights granted to them under the Medicaid
reimbursement program. Pee Dee Health Care, P.A. v. Sanford, 509
F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the Court found that a
rural healthcare provider is entitled to sue under § 1983 to obtain
reimbursement in accordance with federal Medicaid statutes. Sanford,
509 F.3d at 211-12.
Pee Dee Healthcare, P.A. ("Pee Dee") is a healthcare provider
serving low-income patients in rural areas of South Carolina. Pee Dee
is qualified to provide these services under the federal Medicaid
Program. Medicaid service providers, like Pee Dee, are entitled to
receive reimbursement payments from the state. Eligibility for
reimbursement requires health care providers to enter into contracts
with the agency responsible for the administration of the Medicaid
Program, in this case, the South Carolina Department of Health and
Human Services ("SCDHHS"). This contract must contain a forumselection clause that provides that all reimbursement claims must be
pursued through state judicial and administrative avenues. The
reimbursement provisions under the Medicaid program are located in
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(bb) ("§ 1396a(bb)"). Pee Dee claimed that the
state of South Carolina used a formula which was not consistent with
the formula in § 1396a(bb), thus violating its right to proper
reimbursement.
Pee Dee first brought its claim in South Carolina state court against
the Governor of South Carolina, the Director of SCDHHS and
SCDHHS itself. The case was then removed to the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina. Pee Dee then
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amended its complaint to include a federal cause of action pursuant to
§ 1983. The district court dismissed Pee Dee's claim, noting that
venue was inappropriate based on the forum-selection clause in the
contract between Pee Dee and SCDHHS. Pee Dee appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit which reviewed
de novo the district court's dismissal based on the forum-selection
clause.
The Court first examined the language of § 1983 in order to
determine if Pee Dee had a right to bring a private action under that
statute. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210. Section 1983 imposes a liability on
one who, under the color of state law, deprives any person of any
rights, privileges, or immunities guaranteed by the United States
Constitution or laws. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 209-10. A plaintiff
alleging a violation of a federal statue cannot sue under § 1983 if the
statute does not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities
which fall within the meaning of the section or if Congress has
explicitly prohibited such enforcement within the statute itself.
Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210. The Court then identified a test ("Blessing
Test") articulated in Blessing v. Freestone to determine whether a
statute creates an enforceable right. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210 (citing
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997)). In the first part of the
test, the Court looks at Congress' intent to ensure that the provision
benefits the plaintiff. Id. at 210. In the second part of the test, the
Court looks to see that the right protected was not too vague. Id.
Finally, the Court looks at the statute to see if it imposed a binding
obligation on the state. Id. The Court declared that its greatest task
when performing this analysis was to ensure that the statute has
"rights-creating language" and that it is not phrased in terms of general
policy or practice, but rather in terms of the persons who are benefited
by that right. Id. (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002)).
The Court first considered its decisions prior to its current
enactment of the Medicaid statute. Id. at 210. In Va. Hosp. Ass'n v.
Baliles, the Court held that a healthcare provider had a right under §
1983 to challenge a method of reimbursement for healthcare providers
participating in Medicaid programs. Sanford, 509 F .3d at 21 0 (citing
Va. Hosp. Ass'n v. Ealiles, 868 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1989)). In Baliles,
the Court reasoned that the intent and legislative history of the act was
to allow health care providers a right of action against the state when
they felt they were not compensated according to Medicaid
requirements. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210. The Court then identified
another recent decision, Doe v. Kidd, which dealt with another
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Medicaid waiver program. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210-11 (citing Doe v.
Kidd, 501 F.3d 348 (4th. Cir. 2007». In that instance, the Fourth
Circuit allowed a health care provider to pursue a claim using § 1983.
Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210. However, in Doe, the Court found a right of
action under § 1983 only while interpreting a specific portion of §
1396. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 210-11. Pee Dee urged the Court to
consider for the first time whether § 1396, read as a whole, created the
rights necessary to be actionable under § 1983. Sanford, 509 F.3d at
211.
The Court looked at the plain language of each individual subsection of § 1396a(bb). Sanford, 509 F.3d at 211. The Court
acknowledged that §§ 1396a(bb)(l)-(bb)(4) repeat the phrase that "a
state plan shall provide for payment for services." Sanford, 509 F.3d
at 211 (emphasis in original). The Court also looked at the language
of 1396a(bb)(6)(B), which provided that an alternative payment
methodology must be at least equal to the amount required by the
section. Sanford, 509 F .3d at 211.
The Court then applied the Blessing Test to detennine if this
section as a whole created an enforceable right. Sanford, 509 F .3d at
212. The Court began by examining the language in § 1396a(bb)(l),
requiring a state's plan to provide for payment of services provided by
rural health care clinics. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 212. The Court
reasoned that this language indicated Congress' intent for the statute to
benefit rural health care providers such as Pee Dee. Id. Next, the
Court decided that the phrase "shall provide payment" is judicially
enforceable because it is not amorphous or unduly vague. Id. In
addition, the Court noted that the provision clearly required states to
reimburse rural health care providers such as Pee Dee for services
provided to Medicaid patients. Id. Lastly, the Court viewed the
repeated use of "shall" as unambiguously binding the states. Id.
Finally, the Court determined, that the statute contained "rightscreating language" and that the statute was not phrased in general
terms, but rather phrased in tenns of the persons who are benefited by
that right. Id. (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273). The Court determined
that the language in § 1396a(bb) contained "rights creating language"
because it specifically designated the Rural Healthcare Providers as
beneficiaries. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 212 (citing Gonzaga, 536 U.S.
273). The Court also noted that the language mandated action on the
part of the states. Id. at 212. The Court then recognized that §
1396a(bb) did not have an aggregate focus, but rather a very
individualized focus. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 212. In light of these
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factors, the Court recognized that the language of § 1396a(bb) created
an enforceable right under § 1983. Sanford, 509 F.3d at 212.
The Court shows a willingness to interpret a statute, such as §
1396a(bb), broadly. Maryland, much like South Carolina, also has
rural healthcare providers that serve Medicaid recipients. This
decision is important because it shows clinics and providers that they
have an additional avenue of redress should the state deprive them of
their statutorily defined compensation. In addition, this decision will
put Maryland and other states on notice that should they attempt to
deprive clinics of their statutory right to proper payment, there is
another manner by which clinics and providers may obtain adequate
compensation.

